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Introduction 
Since March’s (1991) seminal work, the concept of organizational ambidexterity – the concurrent 
pursuit of exploitation, “the development of things already known”, and exploration, the 
development of new knowledge (Levinthal and March, 1993, p. 105; Lavie et al., 2010) – has 
captured the imagination of organizational scholars. Ambidexterity is considered critical for 
organizational success and yet also extremely difficult to achieve within a single organization 
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2010; He and Wong, 2004; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). In response 
to this recognized difficulty in achieving ambidexterity internally, interest in the role of external 
relationships in enabling ambidexterity has recently burgeoned, primarily with a focus on 
strategic alliances (e.g. Koza and Lewin, 1998; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Raisch and 
Birkinshaw, 2008; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Yet, we still have much to learn about other 
external sources of ambidexterity, foremost among them client relationships. Initial studies 
highlight clients as sources of knowledge (Im and Rai, 2008), but tell us little about how 
knowledge is attained and used within and across client relationships to enable ambidexterity 
over time.   
The literature on knowledge-intensive firms (KIFs), by contrast, has developed some 
understanding of how firms can use client relationships for their own knowledge development 
(Bettencourt et al., 2002; Fosstenløkken et al., 2003; Skjolsvik et al. 2007).1 Such KIFs critically 
rely on their ability to create, preserve and replenish a stock of valuable knowledge that they 
apply in their knowledge-based services (Alvesson, 1995; Moore and Birkinshaw, 1998; Starbuck, 
1992; Von Nordenflycht, 2010). KIFs thus offer a useful context in which to study the potential 
of client relationships to fuel exploration and exploitation. Client knowledge can be a source of 
both exploration and exploitation within KIFs (He and Wong, 2005; Levinthal and March, 1993; 
Lavie et al., 2010); either refining existing knowledge, such as improving an existing solution, or 
                                                 
1 To maintain the authenticity of  our data we use the term ‘clients’, which was consistently used by the KIF 
managers we studied. This is consistent with other KIF studies (Alvesson, 2004; Skjolsvik et al. 2007), but we 
recognise that not all KIFs have clients, some have customers. 
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enabling the pursuit of new knowledge, such as new markets or products that represent a new 
skill or market expertise (Lavie et al., 2010). We draw on illuminating concepts from this 
literature and apply them to an extensive qualitative study covering 22 reinsurance KIFs.  
By explaining client portfolios as a dynamic source of ambidexterity, we contribute to both 
the literatures on ambidexterity and KIFs. Specifically, we develop four empirically grounded 
relationship types, labelled Nurturing, Investigating, Holding and Watching, which collectively form a 
client portfolio that enables ambidexterity for a KIF. We then extend this typology into a process 
framework of how KIFs attain knowledge through their client portfolio, use it to engage in 
exploitation or exploration, and feed back the knowledge gained to evolve their client 
relationships over time. This framework makes three theoretical contributions, primarily to the 
ambidexterity literature, but also to existing knowledge on KIFs. First, contrary to existing 
approaches in the ambidexterity and KIF literatures, our framework highlights interactions 
between exploration and exploitation within single relationships (in-client), as well as across 
client relationships within the client portfolio (across-client). This approach reflects how the 
knowledge value of different relationships – what still needs to be learned, from whom, and for 
what purpose – changes over time according to the basis of existing knowledge in the firm. Our 
framework encapsulates this dynamic client portfolio. Second, drawing on and extending the 
KIF literature, our framework accentuates the role of clients, rather than alliance partners, as 
sources of ambidexterity (e.g. Koza and Lewin, 1998; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). This 
broadens the potential to understand the role of a more diverse set of external relationships, and 
connects ambidexterity to the conduct of everyday business, rather than separate strategic 
initiatives. Third, in contrast to the current focus on the performance benefits of external 
sources of ambidexterity (Im and Rai, 2008; Morgan and Berthon, 2008), our model centres on 
how these benefits are attained. Specifically, we unpack the process and the activities by which 
KIFs attain knowledge from clients, engage in exploration and exploitation within and across 
client relationships in their portfolio, and do so dynamically over time.   
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The paper is structured as follows. First, we review the ambidexterity and KIF literatures on 
exploitation and exploration in client relationships. Second, we outline the reinsurance research 
context and our methodology. Third, we present our findings. Fourth, we conceptualize these 
findings within a dynamic process framework of client relationships. The paper concludes by 
addressing the implications of our findings and providing a framework for managers of large 
client portfolios.  
Theoretical background 
The organizational ambidexterity challenge 
The challenge of achieving ambidexterity lies in the balance of exploration and exploitation 
activities, which are fundamentally at odds in terms of their time horizon, incentivization and 
operation (March, 1991). The broad search that is typical of exploration sacrifices short-term 
refinements and returns in search of flexibility and future value (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003; 
Smith and Tushman, 2005; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). Conversely, exploitation pursues 
immediate stability and reliability, albeit at risk of conservatism and future obsolescence 
(Holmqvist, 2004; Leonard‐Barton, 1992; Lewin et al., 1999). Hence, organizations face a 
dilemma. Incentivizing both sets of behaviours in equal measure is near impossible, as their 
outcomes differ in terms of their “timing, and their distribution within and beyond the 
organization”, yet both are vital to organizational performance (March, 1991, p. 71). Given these 
motivational and operational inconsistencies, investment in one typically drives out the other 
(Benner and Tushman, 2002; Levinthal and March, 1993). Thus, despite wide agreement “on the 
need for balance, there is considerably less clarity on how this balance can be achieved” (Gupta 
et al., 2006, p. 697; see also Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; O'Reilly 
and Tushman, 2011). Recognizing the challenges of achieving ambidexterity internally, scholars 
have developed alternative approaches which involve external partners as enabling of 
ambidexterity (Ferrary, 2011; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). 
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External relationships as a source of ambidexterity 
Recent studies suggest that tensions between exploration and exploitation, as contradictory 
modes of knowledge, can be mitigated through the use of external relationships (Kauppila, 2010; 
Lavie et al., 2010; Nosella et al., 2012; Simsek, 2009). Strategic alliances in particular have 
attracted the majority of attention (Koza and Lewin, 1998; Holmqvist, 2004; Lavie and 
Rosenkopf, 2006; Tiwana, 2008). In this stream of research, numerous authors clearly 
differentiate between “exploration” and “exploitation” relationships, which separately fulfil the 
different learning needs – such as “research” (exploration alliances) and “development” 
(exploitation alliances) – of an organization (e.g. Beckman et al., 2004; Ferrary, 2011; Grant and 
Baden-Fuller, 2004; Kauppila, 2010; Lin et al., 2007; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Vassolo et al., 
2004). Likewise, many discussions of client relationships sharply delineate the pursuit of new 
knowledge for and with emerging clients from the pursuit of knowledge for and with existing 
clients (Cegarra-Navarro and Dewhurst, 2007; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008), considering 
orientation towards emerging clients as a form of “generative learning” or exploration (Morgan 
and Berthon, 2008). Hence, it is only at the aggregate level that clusters of independent 
exploration and exploitation relationships collectively create the balance and superior 
performance that is typical of ambidexterity (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Lin et al., 2007; 
Morgan and Berthon, 2008; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Simsek, 2009). However, a few authors 
offer a different perspective, suggesting that differentiating external relationships by their 
purpose may be inappropriate, because each one can be a source of ambidexterity in its own 
right, fulfilling functions of both exploration and exploitation simultaneously (Holmqvist, 2004; 
Im and Rai, 2008; Koza and Lewin, 2000). 
Despite the growing interest in how ambidexterity can be enabled through external 
relationships, three issues have been under-explored. First, current work largely neglects 
interactions across a client portfolio. That is, how knowledge gained from one client can be used 
to explore or exploit across client relationships in the portfolio, or how the value of knowledge 
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attained within a client relationship can shift with changes to the knowledge-base, or priorities, of 
the firm. This is an important omission as research on collaborative innovation (Dell'Era and 
Verganti, 2010) suggests that the value of knowledge attain in any one collaboration is enhanced by 
its integration with knowledge generated in another. Therefore, we argue for a dynamic portfolio 
perspective on ambidexterity that acknowledges the sources of knowledge and how it is explored 
and exploited, both within client relationships and across the client portfolio. This complements 
existing perspectives by providing a more complete and fluid picture of knowledge attainment 
and utilization in relationship portfolios. It also acknowledges shifts in relationship purposes 
based on the knowledge that they provide relative to an organization’s changing client portfolio. 
These insights elaborate upon current understandings that exploration and exploitation are 
relative to an organization’s existing knowledge base and - through continuous learning and 
growing familiarity - may morph into each other (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lavie et al., 2010). 
In the case of client relationships, such morphing can occur due to shifts in the purposes and 
management of client relationships, as well as the resultant dynamism in client portfolios.  
Second, and relatedly, while alliance partners have received attention as potential sources of 
ambidexterity, clients have been comparatively neglected. Clients are typically cast as silent 
beneficiaries of ambidexterity and, with the exception of Im and Rai (2008), very few studies 
consider them as sources or co-producers. This is striking, as ambidexterity is considered a client-
focused capability, focused on meeting the needs of clients now and in the future (Cegarra-
Navarro and Dewhurst, 2007; Morgan and Berthon, 2008). This is a significant omission insofar 
as alliance and client relationship portfolios differ, both in size and in the sources and 
destinations of knowledge. Resultant differences in ambidexterity dynamics in client portfolios 
therefore merit specific investigation. 
Third, irrespective of relationship type, existing studies focus on the positive performance 
effects of external relationships as a source of ambidexterity, to the neglect of the practices and 
processes that enable this (Gupta et al., 2006; Kauppila, 2010). For instance, Im and Rai (2008) 
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showed that simultaneous sharing of both explorative and exploitative knowledge led to better 
relationship performance, but not how. Other studies use macro-level industry data or large-scale 
surveys to identify causal relationships between ambidexterity and performance (Beckman et al., 
2004; Cegarra-Navarro and Dewhurst, 2007; He and Wong, 2004; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004), 
which inevitably fail to shed light on the processes of how it is attained. Consequently, there is 
still much to learn about the processes and practices through which client portfolios become a 
source of ambidexterity.  
Notably, the literature on KIFs (Alvesson, 1995; Starbuck, 1992) has traditionally paid more 
attention to the practicalities of how knowledge is enabled through client relationships 
(Fosstenløkken et al., 2003; Skjolsvik et al., 2007) and how that knowledge is then managed and 
used (Hansen et al. 1999; Werr and Stjernberg, 2003). Translating some of their illuminating 
concepts into the ambidexterity literature promises to fruitfully address current gaps in our 
understanding of clients as sources of ambidexterity, the dynamism of client portfolios and the 
practicalities of exploration and exploitation.  
 
Knowledge-intensive firms: Attaining and using knowledge from clients 
KIFs are a distinctive class of organisations that trade on the expertise and judgement of their 
staff (Alvesson, 1995; Hansen et al., 1999; Løwendahl et al., 2001; Starbuck, 1992; Winch and 
Schneider, 1993). They are defined as organizations that “offer to the market the use of fairly 
sophisticated knowledge or knowledge-based products” (Alvesson, 2004, p.17), such as an 
assessment of risk and associated financial solutions (or products) in the reinsurance industry.  
The highly complex nature of knowledge work undertaken by KIFs (Maister, 1993; 
McKenna, 2006; Morris and Empson, 1998) is informative in the context of our study of client 
portfolios as sources of ambidexterity. First, fluidity between different modes of exploitation and 
exploration is central to KIFs’ ability to apply their knowledge-based services or products. The 
incremental learning mode that the ambidexterity literature identifies as exploitation is important 
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for the constant refinement and application of existing knowledge to solutions for clients. 
However, KIFs will all encounter, to varying degrees and at different times depending on their 
context, novel client problems and/or the entrepreneurial spirit of knowledge workers (Anand et 
al., 2007), which take KIFs into an explorative mode of “assimilating new knowledge from 
around the world, building new knowledge” (Moore and Birkinshaw, 1998, p. 81). As 
knowledge-based solutions vary in the degree to which they require the refinement of existing 
knowledge, or the development of new knowledge, KIFs display a fluid approach to exploration 
and exploitation (Heusinkveld and Benders, 2005, 2012; Taylor and Greve, 2006), which is 
informative for studies of ambidexterity. Second, the need to tailor knowledge to client demands 
is often characteristic of what many KIFs do. This can turn clients from passive consumers into 
active co-producers of solutions (Bettencourt et al., 2002; Fosstenløkken et al., 2003; Moore and 
Birkinshaw, 1998; Ofek and Sarvary, 2001; Skjolsvik et al., 2007). Hence, the nature of their work 
often directs the attention of KIFs to clients, rather than only alliance partners, as sources of 
ambidexterity. Accordingly, the literature has paid significant attention to selecting clients for 
knowledge value and using that knowledge within the KIF, including leveraging it across client 
assignments.  
Regarding client selection, the KIF literature has long emphasized that, given the necessity 
for knowledge co-production, profitability is not the only selection criterion. Clients who 
promise good profitability may not be “right from a knowledge-development point of view” 
(Fosstenløkken et al., 2003, p. 869; see also Bettencourt et al., 2002). Skjolsvik and colleagues, for 
example, recommend that KIFs should seek a mix of clients, combining profitable routine 
assignments with “a high proportion of novel and customized tasks”, which would maximise 
opportunities for knowledge attainment in order to fuel both exploration and exploitation (2007, 
p.119; see also Sarvary, 1999). However, while the importance of attaining knowledge through 
clients has been acknowledged, the process by which it is attained and utilized within a client 
portfolio, and the detailed characteristics and interrelations of those portfolios, has only begun to 
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be explored. Consequently, while client selection can foster opportunities for knowledge 
generation (Fosstenløkken et al., 2003), there is a scarcity of research showing how knowledge is 
attained within a client relationship and then used, whether through exploration or exploitation, 
not only within that client relationship, but across the client portfolio, and how different parts of 
the portfolio dynamically interrelate over time. Yet this capacity to make the most of knowledge 
rather than restricting it to within-client application is, arguably, where the value of knowledge 
management lies (Sarvary, 1999). 
While the literature on KIFs provides helpful insights to inform broader discussions of 
ambidexterity, it also has shortcomings, two of which are of particular interest here. First, by 
focussing on professional service firms as a relatively narrow subset of KIFs (Haas and Hansen, 
2007; Hansen and Haas, 2001; Hansen et al., 1999; Morris, 2001; Morris and Empson, 1998; 
Werr and Stjernberg, 2003) existing studies neglect important differences between types of KIFs 
(Malhotra and Morris, 2009; Von Nordenflycht, 2010) and the client management challenges 
they face. In particular, other KIFs may operate with larger, more dispersed and more diverse 
client portfolios than the traditional professional service firm. Such portfolios offer greater 
diversity for knowledge attainment (Sarvary, 1999), but also pose greater coordination and 
relationship management challenges. For instance, attaining knowledge within a large client 
portfolio may present unique resource scarcity challenges because the maintenance and 
management of numerous external client relationships is costly and poses greater potential for 
political wrangling among knowledge workers competing for resources (Starbuck, 1992). In 
effect, neither the ambidexterity nor the KIF literature provides a good understanding of how to 
efficiently target and manage large, diversified client portfolios in ways that simultaneously 
maximise profitability and knowledge. Specifically, we lack an approach to clients as a source of 
ambidexterity which focuses on segmenting the client pool in ways that inform KIFs’ choices of 
where to selectively invest precious time and resources in relationship management.  
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Second, while “leveraging” client knowledge across large numbers of diverse client 
relationships has been recognised as an important ingredient for developing and sustaining 
ambidexterity (e.g. Fosstenløkken et al., 2003; Skjolsvik et al., 2007), existing research on KIFs 
provides little insight into how this is achieved in practice. As in treatments of inter-
organizational ambidexterity, client relationships are usually considered in isolation rather than as 
part of a broader portfolio, hence neglecting any interactions between them. Furthermore, while 
individual stages of knowledge attaining, disseminating and using knowledge have received some 
attention, this has typically remained disconnected so that we lack process understandings of 
how portfolio knowledge is attained and used dynamically over time.  
Thus, our study of client relationship management in the reinsurance industry draws on the 
KIF literature to address some important shortcomings in discussions of inter-organizational 
ambidexterity. In doing so, we also address some shortcomings in the KIF literature. We ask: 
How are dynamic client portfolios a source of ambidexterity for KIFs?  We contribute to both literatures by 
exploring this question in a process-orientated way, looking at how knowledge is attained within 
a client portfolio, used to explore and exploit within and across client relationships, and enabled 
through the dynamic management of the client portfolio.   
 
Research Methods 
Research context: The global reinsurance industry 
We draw on a qualitative programme of research into the global reinsurance industry. This 
financial services sector provides reinsurance solutions for insurance companies (clients) seeking 
protection from large insurance claims arising from catastrophic events, such as floods, 
hurricanes or acts of terrorism. The reinsurance industry presents an ideal context to investigate 
how large client portfolios are managed as a source of ambidexterity for KIFs. First, reinsurers’ 
work is highly knowledge-intensive, as they deploy their personal market knowledge, business 
acumen and statistical modelling skills to assess the deals they are underwriting. Second, 
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reinsurers frequently work closely with clients to undertake in-depth analysis and develop 
knowledge-intensive solutions. Knowledge about clients and territories, attained within these 
relationships, is highly sought after because reinsurers have to allocate significant amounts of 
capital amidst high uncertainty. Third, reinsurance firms work with very large numbers of clients 
and frequently tailor reinsurance solutions – called financial “products” – of varying degrees of 
complexity. However, there is great variation in the degree of customization a reinsurer might 
offer, ranging from novel customized solutions for some clients to “renewals” of existing 
product solutions for others. It is in the development and provision of these varied financial 
solutions that reinsurers bring to bear their expertise.  
Our study speaks to KIFs with large client or customer portfolios, as each individual 
manager appraises up to 400 deals from a broad variety of clients each year. Hence, their time to 
interact with these clients to access market intelligence, select clients, build goodwill, generate 
business and develop solutions becomes a scarce resource. Reinsurance firms, and their 
numerous client interactions, therefore present an opportunity to study first-hand how KIFs 
manage the coordination and relationship management challenges associated with large client 
pools, and the opportunities for ambidexterity they provide (Sarvary, 1999).   
 
Data collection 
This paper draws from a data set gathered from a wider programme of research into the global 
reinsurance industry, covering the main reinsurance markets of Lloyd’s of London, Bermuda and 
Continental Europe, and some additional data from the Asia-Pacific region. We accessed 22 
reinsurance firms ranging from the largest reinsurers in the world, such as those domiciled in 
Continental Europe with client revenues upwards of US$10 billion dollars, to smaller firms, such 
as European start-ups or smaller Lloyd’s syndicates with client revenues of as little as US$200 
million.  These firms varied in terms of their geographical reach, the range of solutions they 
provided, and their strategic intent. However, consistent with our theoretical sampling, they all 
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had large client portfolios and delivered a range of solutions from the highly novel or customized 
to the more standard “renewal” business.  Moreover, we found these organisations select and 
manage their client portfolios in very similar ways; leading us to consider our dataset as a single 
“industry” case, as we explain in the analytic section below.  
Over three years from 2009-2012 we conducted 382 interviews with reinsurers as well as a 
number of reinsurance brokers, each lasting on average 60 minutes, all audio recorded and fully 
transcribed. These interviews included, amongst other things, discussions about client selection, 
client interaction strategies and knowledge attainment through client relationships. In addition, 
we studied the day-to-day practices of reinsurance managers. We observed them for sustained 
periods in their offices, on trading floors, in client meetings, during internal meetings and risk 
reviews, at corporate events and during industry conferences. In total, we collected detailed 
ethnographic fieldnotes from 935 sessions (full or half days) of observing reinsurers performing 
these everyday practices. Most observations were audio-recorded and detailed notes were typed 
up either in real-time or every evening. The audio-recordings allowed us to re-visit crucial events 
during analysis and check the reliability of our emerging interpretations (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985).  
All data was loaded in NVivo (a qualitative data software tool) for analysis, enabling the 
searching, indexing and selection of data for more focused coding around particular issues. The 
data for this paper is drawn from this wider data set. We searched NVivo for data pertaining to 
client interactions and relationships, including all observations of client meetings, data coded to 
client interactions, and passages of data that contained terms in close proximity to the word 
“client”, such as “relationship”, “meeting”, “visit”, “data”, “knowledge”, “management”, and 
“system”. Passages deemed relevant by the authors, three of whom had been involved in 
collecting the data, were expanded to include surrounding passages to ensure we had captured 
relevant context. This enabled us to extract a focused data set from 175 interviews and 261 
observational fieldnotes which we analyzed. 
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Analytic approach 
As is typical of exploratory process questions (Langley, 1999), our analysis moved through 
several phases. First, while still in the field, we noticed a great deal of variation in activities for 
managing client relationships, which was the initial inspiration for this paper. Together, we began 
in vivo theorising about client management practices as a way of attaining knowledge, which led 
us to develop more focused fieldnotes on what we saw reinsurers doing, such as entering client 
knowledge into databases, or using client knowledge to assess deals.  
Second, as our research question emerged, we began coding our focused data set, highlighting 
client interactions and the knowledge flows stemming from such interactions. Initially we used 
the knowledge management process as a broad organizing framework, focussing on activities 
associated with knowledge attainment and utilization (Grover and Davenport, 2001; Nonaka and 
Teece, 2001; von Krogh et al., 2001). This helped us develop a set of focused questions to 
interrogate the data set.  
Specifically, we asked: where does client knowledge come from? Our coded data showed that 
knowledge from clients was attained within different types of interaction activities that reinsurers 
classified as ‘”conference meetings”, “road-shows”, “site visits” and “social events”, and that the 
use of these activities varied. For example, some activities, such as conferences, were common 
across the client portfolio, whereas more resource-intensive activities, such as site visits, were 
reserved for specific clients. We noticed especially how reinsurers talked about the different 
“knowledge value” and “economic value” of clients. This prompted us to investigate what kind 
of knowledge was being attained through these different types of interactions, whether it enabled 
reinsurers to explore or exploit. Additionally, we found that reinsurers made four main types of 
decisions on deals– no deal, small deals, mid-sized and large deals – and that these deal decisions 
were underpinned by economic evaluations, but also by the knowledge value of doing a deal with 
a specific client. We grew confident, then, that considerations of economic and knowledge value 
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were key determinants of both how reinsurers segmented their client portfolios and the activities 
they used to engage with and attain knowledge within client relationships, and that this 
segmentation was key to their decisions on deals with these clients (See Appendix 1).  
We then queried: what do reinsurers do to attain knowledge value through clients? Through our 
coding it became apparent that, consistent with Levinthal and March’s (1993) definition, client 
knowledge was used for both exploitation and exploration. For example, when managers talked 
about using knowledge to “clean up deals” or “improve existing product solutions” we coded 
this as exploitation. When managers talked about using knowledge for “completely new pricing 
solutions” or “developing novel products” we coded this as exploration. As we looked closely at 
the exploitation and exploration patterns, two dynamics emerged. First, knowledge attained 
within a particular client relationship enabled reinsurance managers to explore and exploit within 
that same client relationship. Second, knowledge accessed with a particular client relationship 
was also used to fuel either exploration or exploitation across relationships within the client 
portfolio. In essence, we were struck by the entangled nature of exploitation and exploration 
when considered at the level of the client portfolio. For example, when knowledge attained 
within one client relationship was applied to refine solutions with other clients (exploitation-
across clients) and build novel solutions (e.g. “terrorism product”) that were applicable to 
different clients (exploration-across clients) (see Appendix 2).  
Third, we began to move from our initial categories which drew heavily on the language of 
our informants (van Maanen, 1988) to theorizing about the findings at a higher level of 
abstraction. In particular, we generated concepts and labels (Gioia et al., 2012; Pratt, 2009) for 
different types of client relationship, such as “Holding”, “Nurturing”, “Investigating” and 
“Watching” relationships; whereby we explicated links in our data between the client “value” 
dimensions (knowledge and economic value) and the various engagement strategies (size of deal 
and forms of interaction). As we surveyed our themes, it became apparent that “high-knowledge 
potential” was not only associated with an ability to explore and exploit knowledge gained within 
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and for a single client relationship (in-client), but also the capacity to use knowledge across the 
wider portfolio (across-client). As we interrogated our data and the interrelations between our 
themes it became apparent that the relationship between knowledge value of clients and client 
management was a dynamic, continuously evolving process (see Appendix C).  This final layer of 
analysis is further theorized in the discussion with a framework that illustrates how KIFs 
dynamically attain and use knowledge within and across their portfolio of client relationships to 
enable ambidexterity. 
Findings: Client portfolios as a source of ambidexterity 
Our findings show how client portfolios become a source of ambidexterity for KIFs. First, we 
describe how reinsurance firms attain knowledge from relationships within different segments of 
their client portfolios, which we label: Nurturing, Maintaining, Investigating and Watching, each 
of which is associated with a particular assessment of value and engagement response. Second, 
we discuss how reinsurance firms used the knowledge attained to explore and exploit both within 
client relationships and across client relationships. Finally, we outline how client portfolios are 
managed dynamically to sustain ambidexterity over time (See Table 1).  
< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
A. Segmenting client interactions  
The reinsurance firms in our study had large and diverse client portfolios with clients that varied 
in size, evolution, market presence and product needs. Connections with these clients 
encompassed everything from longstanding to embryonic relationships. Efficiently managing 
such large client portfolios required reinsurers to make evaluations about where to invest 
precious time and resources. In particular, we found reinsurers to interact with clients in four 
main ways, ordered from least to most resource intensive: conference meetings (where they can meet 
multiple clients for short meetings at the same place at an industry event), road-show meetings 
(where the client visits their premises), site visits (where they visit their client’s premises) and social 
events (where they entertain their clients, sometimes on a very lavish scale). Reinsurers also had 
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the choice whether or not to enter into a financial transaction with a client ranging from 
decisions to engage in: no deal, small deal, moderate deal or large deal. They varied this engagement 
depending on the “value” of the client, ranging from brief conference meetings, but no actual 
deal, with some clients to all types of interactions, including large-scale social events, and large 
deals with their most valuable clients.  
Our findings suggest that reinsurance firms segment their client portfolios according to the 
economic value and knowledge value of their clients. Unsurprisingly, concerns about economic 
returns were central in determining how reinsurers categorised and managed client relationships. 
However, reinsurers were also obviously aware that their client interactions were a critical source 
of knowledge. Judgements about the knowledge value of particular clients emerged as central in 
determining how reinsurers managed those particular relationships. While economic value and 
knowledge value were inevitably entangled in practice, our analysis shows that both 
considerations were at play in segmenting client portfolios into four relationship types: Watching, 
Investigating, Nurturing and Holding relationships. We now describe each relationship type, how it 
was managed and the different knowledge flows it enabled (See Appendix A). 
Watching relationships. Watching relationships are lower engagement relationships 
involving limited interactions (e.g. conference meetings) and small, or no, deals. They were used 
when clients were perceived to have low or uncertain economic and knowledge value today, but 
with some prospect of potential future value. For instance, reinsurers recognized that their 
appetite for a geographic market or product might change. Hence, Watching relationships were 
maintained because of the potential for future knowledge or economic gains. In our study, 
clients in emerging markets often fell into this category. As a manager described:  
In emerging markets we’re the prospectors […] I don’t see many prospects currently in the short- 
to mid-term […] For example in China we’ll go out, do the best you can but this is the box, this is 
the sandbox you're playing in. It’s a taster (Interview).  
 
While there was low potential for exploitation, with minimal existing knowledge to “exploit” and 
little current investment, there was some potential for exploration as a “taster” for the future. 
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Watching relationships were, therefore, a valuable form of connection to clients that could 
increase in knowledge and/or economic value, for instance, as they or their market grew. 
Watching relationships were managed through deal decisions and interaction choices.  
Within such relationships, sometimes very small deals would be used to stay connected to the 
client. Indeed, the term “watching line” was used across firms to indicate a very small deal with a 
(currently) lower-value client, just to “watch” and see what happens. More often, however, the 
economic returns and knowledge value were deemed insufficient or too uncertain to warrant a 
deal at the time. This is illustrated in the following fieldnote where a manager declined a deal, 
because the profitability at the time was too uncertain, while leaving open the possibility of doing 
a deal in the future, “please show it to me again. It might be something we could do next year. We’re certainly 
interested to grow there if the market develops” (Fieldnote). As this quote indicates, what distinguishes a 
“Watching” relationship, versus no relationship at all, is a sense that there could be potential 
future value “next year”. Reinsurers were able to maintain a high number of Watching 
relationships using light touch interaction. Industry conference meetings, for example, provided 
a particularly efficient means to engage with large numbers of existing and potential clients, 
allowing a single manager to conduct up to 30 individual meetings over a couple of days. These 
light touch, low cost interactions enabled reinsurers to “watch” - and attain knowledge from - 
many clients who were currently perceived to be of relatively low value, but with potential for 
that value to increase: “we might decide to just see them at a conference rather see them any other way” 
(Interview).  Doing so, reinsurers were able to tap into the explorative potential of these 
relationships and stay attuned to opportunities that could warrant a change in the relationship in 
the future.  
Holding relationships. Holding relationships are moderate-engagement relationships, 
characterized by moderate interactions (largely conference and roadshow meetings) and 
moderate-size deals. These were used when clients were deemed to have established economic 
value, but relatively low knowledge value. For instance, many clients provided a stable source of 
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economic value, were well known, well established and operated at their ideal size with no major 
plans to change. In our study, this often occurred in mature Western European and US markets 
where a client’s business was relatively stable. While interactions with these clients were not 
expected to trigger the exploration of new avenues, they were still an important source of 
exploitation, allowing reinsurers to refine and modify services and products and get the most 
from existing offerings. As one manager put it, working with these clients enabled them to 
gradually “clean up all the little bits in their products” (Interview). This, in turn, helped reinsurers to 
protect their market share, maintain important client relations and maximize economic value. 
Holding relationships were managed through specific deal decisions and interaction choices.  
Reinsurers often maintained mid-sized deals with these clients, as a manager explains:  
We have a very long history with [Client] so over time we’ve reached a kind of optimum. We are 
already more or less where we want to be in terms profitability and the size of the relationship. 
With these moderate-sized European clients they usually are stable and we often have quite a long 
history of maintaining stable deals with them (Interview).  
 
Interaction frequency and depth also supported the attainment of knowledge which was likely to 
be a source of exploitation for reinsurers. In addition to conference meetings, reinsurers used 
“road show meetings” where clients visited reinsurers to provide face-to-face updates and 
discuss plans. For example, in the quote below a manager explains how they are looking forward 
to a particular meeting to attain knowledge from a client that will refine their understanding of 
the client’s situation:  
More than half of our US clients will come here every year, maybe more than once, to visit […] 
That’s valuable. For example, Client [Name] is of particular interest this year because of a problem 
they’ve been having, so you want to know are they still okay. So that’s one that springs to mind 
regarding the value of those meetings (Interview).  
 
While road show meetings were more resource-intensive than conference meetings, in terms of 
getting a team together to meet the client, the resource investment was justifiable, not least 
because these client interactions provided a required stream of knowledge to refine and improve 
existing solutions for that client (exploitation).  
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Investigating relationships. Investigating relationships are also moderate-engagement 
relationships, but unlike Holding relationships, they usually involve more intensive interactions, 
including resource-intensive site visits, but smaller-sized deals. These were used when clients had 
low or uncertain economic value, but were deemed to offer much potential for exploration, 
alongside some moderate exploitation. In these instances, reinsurers entered small deals with 
clients which, despite relatively low or uncertain profitability, promised knowledge about an 
under-explored territory (e.g. Eastern Europe or Aviation in India as shown in Appendix A) or 
product line (e.g. terrorism products following the 9/11 attacks) which they knew little about, 
but were interested in pursuing. As one manager described to his peers during an internal 
meeting: 
Manager: ‘We’re so new to this territory we thought it would be best to latch onto this client’s 
penetration [in new territory] and through that get a good understanding of the market and other 
clients’. Colleague: ‘yup, we’re on a journey of discovery in Eastern Europe’. The manager points 
out the disadvantage; that ‘it is not that well priced’ which is why they are only doing a small deal 
with the client (Fieldnote).  
 
Investigating relationships were managed through deal decisions and interaction choices. 
Because economic value was uncertain or low, these relationships were associated, as in the 
example above, with smaller deals that enabled reinsurers to “put a toe in the water” (Fieldnote) or 
“do a small deal […] to get a window on the world” (Interview) by intensifying their engagement with a 
client. Small deals allowed reinsurers to strengthen their connections with the client and thereby 
attain knowledge, while maintaining a degree of protection to “see how it develops”, adjusting 
their investment in lockstep with the client’s evolution.  
Interaction frequency and depth also increased when using Investigating relationships, 
moving beyond conference meetings and road show meetings to include, for example, site visits. 
In reinsurance, site visits were a more in-depth and resource-intensive form of interaction where 
managers visited the client’s premises, sometimes for days at a time, to attain in-depth knowledge 
directly from the client. During these visits, for example, reinsurers would learn about the clients’ 
work practices, inspect their books and visit objects being insured. As one manager explained, 
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these deeper forms of engagement provided more nuanced insights, allowing them to “kick the 
tyres, to go on-site where everything takes place and look at files, talk to underwriters” (Interview).  
Nurturing relationships. Nurturing relationships are high-engagement relationships 
involving more intensive interactions, including expensive social events, and larger-sized deals. In 
particular, these relationships were used when a client’s knowledge value and profitability were 
both considered high and/or growing. These relationships were reserved for a small body of top 
clients that were often global industry leaders. In reinsurance, these clients had extremely high 
knowledge value because they were usually large companies that spanned multiple territories and 
product lines, often operating at the forefront of industry developments.  As one manager told 
us, these are the clients that can “generate a lot of the new product ideas, design…everything” (Interview). 
These were often demanding clients whose complex needs required reinsurers to innovate 
(exploration), whilst maintaining constant engagement to continuously refine their solutions and 
“resolve anything that is an overhanging issue from the previous year” (Interview) to ensure these critical 
clients were kept happy (exploitation). 
Nurturing relationships were managed through deal decisions and interaction choices. The 
high knowledge value potential of these clients, alongside their high economic value, made these 
clients a highly desirable segment and reinsurers sought to do as much business as possible with 
them, including large deals. As one manager explained: “Our shares on their deals are probably as large 
as they get. And we’ll never replace that revenue volume with half a dozen small clients” (Interview).  
Interaction choices were oriented towards cultivating and protecting these client relationships, 
enabling reinsurers to generate more business and attain knowledge that could fuel innovative 
new solutions for those clients, but also for the overall client portfolio. In addition to conference 
meetings, road show meetings and site visits, for example, reinsurers would use large-scale social 
events, which ranged from wining and dining, to playing golf, to climbing mountains, to 
chartered sailing trips with clients. As these forms of interaction involved high costs and 
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significant time investments from senior executives and managers, they were reserved for the 
most valuable clients:  
The clients invited to our big corporate event probably generated $150-200 million for us.  We 
might have spent $250,000 on an event, it’s peanuts by comparison. But our ability to outperform 
in our business is in part generated by our ability to understand our clients well, which is tied to 
that kind of event (Interview).  
 
According to reinsurers, this investment was justified because spending time in less formalised 
settings fostered more open discussions, a much more nuanced understanding of their client’s 
business, and access to unique and valuable insights. 
In summary, reinsurance firms operated with large and diverse client portfolios. They dealt 
with this challenge by segmenting clients according to their perceived economic and knowledge 
value, which resulted in client portfolios being managed using four relationship types, each 
associated with different deal decisions, interaction choices and knowledge inflows.  
B. Using client knowledge for ambidexterity  
We now turn to the ways in which reinsurers utilised these various knowledge inflows for 
ambidexterity. Our analysis suggests that the knowledge attained within the four relationship 
types was used in two main ways to drive both exploration and exploitation. First, knowledge 
was explored and exploited within client relationships; that is, to develop or refine the offerings 
for the very client with whom the knowledge was attained. Second, knowledge from client 
interactions was used more broadly to fuel exploration or exploitation across the client portfolio; 
that is, exploitative and explorative within one particular clients relationship was frequently used 
to fuel exploitation and exploration in other relationships across the client portfolio (See 
Appendix B).  
Using knowledge for exploration or exploitation within client relationships. The 
knowledge attained within a client relationship was frequently a source of both exploitation and 
exploration within the same client relationship. For example, knowledge attained within 
Nurturing, Investigating and Holding relationships was often used to incrementally refine 
existing client deals, sometimes with spill-over effects across product classes:  
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We used to only engage on aspects of the Marine deal; we avoided one element of it because it 
included bits of Casualty [usually a distinct deal from Marine] which made it messy. But over time 
one of our Casualty people sat down with this client and developed a new deal with [client] that 
cleaned up all the bits that I didn't like in the Marine deal so that we could then engage fully, which 
we have started to do (Fieldnote). 
 
Here, the knowledge attained within a client relationship was primarily used to refine an existing 
product, but also helped tailor a new product for the same client (i.e., exploitation with some 
exploration).  
However, client knowledge could also drive new knowledge development more directly. As 
one manager explained, deep knowledge about a client provides opportunities to be “proactive 
about trying to offer them solutions” (Interview); he continued:  
So we’ve had all these meetings with them. We really know them now […] and we have created a 
bespoke product for them that was fresh and new. I'm now structuring something else for them. 
They explained their problem to me and I'm trying to create something that will be completely new 
(Interview). 
 
In this example, the knowledge attained through client meetings was a source of exploration for 
that same client; that is the development of a solution that was “completely new” for both the 
reinsurer and the client. In sum, knowledge attained within individual client interactions was used 
to make refinements to what was already known (exploitation) and engage in new knowledge 
development by creating new solutions for that client (exploration). 
Using knowledge for exploration or exploitation across the client portfolio. Reinsurers 
also recognised that the knowledge attained within client interactions could be used to engage in 
exploitation and/or exploration across the client portfolio. Hence, at the portfolio level, 
exploitation and exploration were often entangled in practice, flowing across client relationships 
in various ways. For illustration purposes we analytically disentangle four main dynamics of using 
knowledge across the portfolio, with knowledge gained within one client relationship often able 
be used to enable reinsurers to engage in either exploitation or exploitation for other clients. This 
relied on various knowledge sharing mechanisms such as information repositories or the 
distribution of client notes, which were common in all the firms we studied. As one manager 
explained, “We have lots of meetings with clients […] And then you get notes from those meetings and 
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information packs. You integrate all the information and distribute it internally so that people know exactly 
[what was discussed]” (Interview). Specifically, these knowledge sharing mechanisms enabled the 
cross-client exploration and exploitation in four ways. 
First, exploitation with one client often enabled exploitation, such as the refinement of a 
product, with another client. As the following fieldnote illustrates, long-term exploitation with 
one client (A) enabled Rachel to refine her understanding of another client (B), in the same 
territory:  
Rachel says she doesn’t have a lot of information for this new client [Client B] and needs a little 
more. She goes into the knowledge-management system and digs up information on [Client A] 
from the same territory. They really understand Client A, as one of Rachel’s colleagues has been 
working with them for years. Drawing on knowledge of Client A, Rachel does some analysis to her 
understanding regarding doing a deal with Client B (Fieldnote).  
 
More typically, exploitation across client relationships involved applying knowledge from one 
client to a variety of clients, or combining knowledge from various sources to improve product 
offerings for a range of clients. For example, reinsurers regularly combined insights attained 
from different clients to refine pricing solutions in geographic regions, which were then applied 
across multiple clients in that region (see Appendix B).  
Second, exploitation with one or multiple clients was sometimes a catalyst for exploration 
with others. While this dynamic was less frequently observed, it was an important source of 
ambidexterity as existing knowledge was not just refined but enabled new knowledge 
development. For example, one manager was trying to develop a highly innovative product to 
meet the complex needs of an important client in TerritoryA. He explained that “from a Western 
perspective this [new deal] is very risky”. Ultimately, he was only able to do this because of his 
previous experience in TerritoryA gained through his multiple interactions with clients over 
more standard products. While he went on to develop new knowledge (exploration) to extend 
what he already knew from his portfolio of TerritoryA clients, this foundation was central in 
supporting his exploration, because he could ultimately understand “there is a logic behind [the new 
request]; we know why they do it” (Fieldnote). Thus, we saw reinsurers engage in exploration based 
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on the foundation of exploitation they had previously engaged in with a wider portfolio of 
clients. 
Third, exploration with one client often enabled exploration across the wider portfolio. 
Nurturing and Investigating relationships, in particular, were central in providing opportunities 
for new knowledge development that was not client-specific, but more widely applicable. For 
instance, knowledge obtained through doing small deals to try-out an unknown territory were 
often not bound to the particular client with whom it was attained. Rather, the exploration of 
that territory, enabled by relations with one particular client, was applicable to multiple clients in 
that territory, sometimes prompting further exploration with other clients. Similarly, as in the 
example below, knowledge gained through “satellite” Investigating relationships were intended 
to bring innovation to the entire portfolio of marine products, rather than being only applicable 
to those “satellites” that were the source of the knowledge: “With our marine business, we have a few 
solid, large connections [clients], around which we’d then build the additional portfolio. Those “satellites”…they 
bring innovation to it [the marine portfolio] (Interview).  
Finally, exploration with one client – e.g. the development of a new product, or new 
valuable knowledge about a territory – regularly fuelled exploitation with other clients as this new 
knowledge was refined and reapplied across the client portfolio. For instance, in the following 
indicative example new knowledge – a novel database compiled by the client that would change 
how the KIF dealt with this market – was attained within one Nurturing relationship: 
The client explained that they had developed a new technical flood database for [Territory A]. The 
reinsurance manager is immediately interested: ‘who do you work with in order to develop such a 
database?’ The client explains that they work with local Councils, the federal government, 
universities and Google mapping. The reinsurance manager is taking notes quickly as the client 
talks. Observing the manager’s interest, the client says that on her next site visit, he will introduce 
her to the team who developed the model: She can take 2-3 days to get a thorough understanding 
(Fieldnote). 
 
As the manager stated afterwards, access to this client’s novel database would then allow her 
firm to refine their solutions (exploitation) for all clients in Territory A (see Appendix B). 
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In summary, reinsurers used knowledge from client interactions to exploit and explore with 
specific clients. However, they also used it across their client portfolio by directly applying 
knowledge from one client to another and by developing composite pictures of particular client 
groups or territories.  
 
C. Dynamically managing client portfolios for ambidexterity. 
We have described how reinsurance firms: (a) sourced knowledge through segmented client 
portfolios and (b) used that knowledge to explore and exploit within particular client 
relationships and across the client portfolio. However, managing these client portfolios was a 
dynamic process, wherein the knowledge and economic value of clients grew or abated and their 
management was changed accordingly.  While such changes can sometimes be hampered by 
internal politics and turf wars, the organizations we studied recognised that knowledge and 
economic value were key drivers of on-going (re)-evaluations of client relationships and their 
management  (See Appendix C). 
Managing growing knowledge and economic value. Watching, Holding and 
Investigating relationships all had the potential to increase in value (see Table 1). Indeed, the 
reinsurers we studied managed their portfolios with potential growth firmly in mind, as indicated 
by this example of a Watching relationship: “Very often it’s not profitable for the time being […but if] we 
believe this client will be profitable in the future, then we talk to them” (Interview). Reinsurers were, 
therefore, acutely sensitive to the evolution of clients and their potential growth in revenue or 
knowledge value; as one manager outlined in the following email to a broker about a client:  
We had a lengthy discussion today about whether we would be in the position to do a small deal 
with [Client A]. However, the data quality provided did not give us enough comfort. Hence, I am 
afraid that we cannot do a deal for the year 2012. We would like to have a meeting with [Client A] 
especially addressing this issue, as I am convinced they provides good quality potential (Fieldnote). 
  
There are many reasons why the value of a particular client might increase. First, external events, 
such as terrorist attacks or catastrophic events, could generate demand for new types of products 
(e.g. complex terrorism products) and/or changes to the profitability of a region. For instance, 
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we observed managers talking about how Japanese clients became more economically attractive, 
because of price increases following the Tohoku earthquake. The knowledge value of these 
clients also increased as reinsurers clambered to gain the requisite knowledge about this market 
and these clients. Indeed, many reinsurers flew to Tokyo during 2011 and 2012, seeking to shift 
Japanese clients from Holding to Nurturing relationships, in order to attain knowledge and do 
larger deals with those clients. Second, reinsurers’ strategy shifts could also change the value 
potential of clients, for instance when looking for opportunities to enter new markets or develop 
new products. Clients who could provide insights into those products or territories became more 
valuable to the firm. For instance, in 2011 GrowthCo (pseudonym) decided to expand into 
European Casualty business and thus suddenly made clients in that region and business - who 
they had considered Watching relationships at best a few years earlier - “high-value” targets. 
Finally, clients themselves sometimes changed in ways that increased their value. For instance, 
one client who maintained Holding relationships with many reinsurers developed a new product 
which signalled an increased knowledge value. Consequently, many reinsurers tried to elevate 
their relationship status from Holding to Nurturing.  Those that were successful reaped the 
economic rewards of this new product (economic value), while also learning about a new 
product which they felt could dominate the industry in the future (knowledge value).  
Managing decreasing knowledge or economic value. Responding to decreases in the 
value of particular clients was also critical to maintain the client portfolio as a source of 
ambidexterity. Managers pointed out that who they considered their high-value clients changed 
over time: 
There are clients where I've radically cut back my participation and yet they're on our list as a key 
strategic partner for growth. However, the types of deals that they provide were simply currently 
not profitable” (Interview). 
  
In this way, being attuned to decreases in the economic value of clients, and adjusting the type of 
interaction used, was vitally important, even those considered “key strategic partners”. Shifts in 
knowledge value were also carefully monitored. For instance, in one meeting at FirmA a Senior 
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Manager, Brent, explained to his team that, as part of their consolidation strategy, they were 
going to scale back in a market they had been investigating to concentrate on their traditional 
markets instead. This meant that a number of Investigating relationships became Watching 
relationships. Such changes sometimes generated internal contestation. For example, during the 
meeting above, Tony, a manager in charge of “new territories” in FirmA, questioned Brent’s 
plans to scale back on new territories, pointing out that this meant a reduction in his personal of 
business, arguing that: “[it] is not realistic to cut 100 million from me!” (Fieldnote).  
Aside from obvious fluctuations in expected client profitability, our analysis suggests that 
there was a temporal element to knowledge value. All things being equal, the knowledge value of 
many client relationships tended to decrease over time. As reinsurers gained knowledge from 
(and about) a particular client over a number of years they learnt most of what they needed to 
know.  Thus, the relative potential for new knowledge generation gradually diminished. Over the 
course of a long-term relationship with a profitable client, therefore, clients often gravitated from 
a Nurturing relationship to a Holding relationship as reinsurers became knowledgeable about the 
client to the point that there was little more knowledge to be gained. Furthermore, once 
investigated, particular markets would sometimes have less potential than expected. If a reinsurer 
engaged in an Investigating relationship with, for example, an Albanian client over a few years 
they eventually reached a point where they had little left to learn from that client – indeed, their 
investigations may have  negatively assess the economic value of Albanian clients. As a result 
they would then scale back that client relationship to either a Watching relationship or perhaps 
no relationship at all.  We often saw this as reinsurers “tested” markets through Investigating 
relationships, but then withdrew as they got to know more.  
A dynamic view of managing client portfolios for ambidexterity. Shifts in one part of 
the portfolio often impacted relationships in another, rather than being contained within one 
particular client relationship. This sometimes made dynamism a contested issue as specific 
individuals, or units, sought to protect or advance their parts of the portfolio relative to others.  
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For example, one manager we observed was upset when senior management sought to 
dramatically reallocate resources from his area to other, more attractive, territories:  
The issue with having to reduce with those clients is that you can destroy relationships. That’s our 
social capital, something you retain even if you leave the firm; but not if you have to destroy that 
social capital due to a senior management directive!” (Fieldnote) 
 
Nevertheless, such changes were critical. A dynamic view of managing client portfolios for 
ambidexterity recognises that relationship types were constantly adjusted, as discussed above, 
and that these adjustments were not considered in isolation. Rather, what constitutes “knowledge 
value” was contingent upon the organization’s existing knowledge base, environmental events, 
and strategic imperatives.  Further, trade-offs needed to be made.  Due to finite resources, 
investing in one relationship often meant not investing in another. There were only so many 
Nurturing relationships a reinsurer could maintain or target at any one time, given limited 
capacity to do large deals and engage in intensive interactions. We frequently saw reinsurers 
chose to decrease their engagement with one client, from a Nurturing to Holding relationship for 
example, not due to changes necessarily with that client, but due to the belief that another client 
had increased in value. A manager made such a connection between Client A and Client B 
below:  
We went to Client A who is an excellent client. The next day we went to Client B and they're a 
complete shambles. They're officially in the top 15 of our “gold” clients, but in reality I think 
they're probably now in the top 100 […] So I said to Client A we are available to do a larger deal 
with them than we did last year (Interview) 
 
In this sense, it was Client A, rather than their previous “gold” Client B, to whom valuable CEO 
time for CEO-CEO meetings and investments in a large deal would be made available.  
There was also a limit to how many Investigating relationships firms required. For instance, 
if a reinsurer developed an Investigating relationship with Client A to learn about a particular 
geographic market, then Client B – from the same territory – would represent less knowledge 
value as this knowledge was already being gained through Client A. Indeed, reinsurers frequently 
talked about particular clients as being, for example, “the right one to learn about Poland” (Fieldnote), 
so impacting the perceived knowledge value of other clients in that region. If over time Client C 
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– rather than Client A - became viewed as a better means through which to attain knowledge 
about a particular product or market then the development of an Investigating relationship with 
Client C decreased the value of Client A, with whom an Investigating relationship was no longer 
necessary. As these examples suggest, understanding changes in a client’s relative value, whether 
knowledge or economic, must be situated within a broader client portfolio and the complex 
interrelationships within it.  
Discussion 
This paper set out to address the research question: How are dynamic client portfolios a source 
of ambidexterity for KIFs?  We now build directly from our findings above (A-C) to develop a 
process model that addresses this question (see Figure 1). This model constitutes a conceptual 
framework, illustrating how client interactions enable valuable knowledge flows (Bettencourt et 
al., 2002; Moore and Birkinshaw, 1998; Ofek and Sarvary, 2001; Skjolsvik et al., 2007) that are 
used within and across relationships in a client portfolio (e.g. Fosstenløkken et al., 2003; Skjolsvik 
et al., 2007) to enable both exploitation and exploration (March, 1991). We outline how, by 
assessing economic and knowledge value, KIFs can manage client portfolios to enhance their 
ambidexterity, and can do so over time by dynamically adjusting the composition of the portfolio 
in line with shifts in relative value.  
< Insert Figure 1 here > 
 
First, building from section A in our findings, the model shows how the differentiated 
relationship types constitute a segmented client portfolio (Box A, Figure 1) that produces 
different knowledge flows for exploitation and exploration within a KIF (Box B). Each 
relationship type is associated with different types of deal decisions and interaction activities. At 
one extreme, deep engagement with clients in Nurturing relationships has high knowledge value, 
both in exploiting existing products and markets, and in exploring new opportunities. At the 
other extreme, the light touch of Watching relationships produces minimal knowledge, although 
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there is some potential for exploration, as indicated by the relative size of the black (exploitation) 
and white (exploration) bars in Figure 1.  
Second, building from Section B in our findings, knowledge flows attained within a 
segmented client portfolio are used within specific client relationship, but also across the 
portfolio more broadly (Skjolsvik et al., 2007). The critical insight is that the knowledge value of 
any one client is not determined solely by its use with that particular client, but by the 
opportunities for using this knowledge to engage in exploitation and exploration across 
relationships in the KIF’s client portfolio. As a result, client selection should not exclusively 
focus on the independent value a particular relationship, but – more broadly – on the knowledge 
and associated economic value it can unlock across the portfolio. By effectively using the 
knowledge gained through high-knowledge value clients (e.g. Investigating relationships and 
Nurturing relationships), KIFs enable both exploitative (e.g. refining products or deals) and 
explorative (e.g. generating new products and accessing new clients and markets) outputs. Most 
critically, in light of our previous argument, this understanding helps KIFs balance the 
competition for high-value client relationships with those that provide emerging opportunities. 
For example, while any KIF would want to work with Nurturing clients of high economic and 
knowledge value, KIFs with a more differentiated portfolio can also focus on the value from 
Investigating relationships. While these other relationships may appear less attractive to 
competitors, given their current lower economic value, KIFs with an ambidextrous approach can 
use their knowledge from these relationships to unlock hidden value across their portfolio.  
Finally, the management of the client portfolio has been shown to be dynamic, with clients 
moving between relationship types as their knowledge and economic value fluctuates. The client 
portfolio is continuously re-evaluated and adjusted as managers trade-off resource costs 
associated with different relationship types and interactional activities against perceived 
knowledge and economic values of a client relationship (Box C); a process which is sometimes 
contested or political (Starbuck, 1992). Indeed, the composition of the client portfolio will be 
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dynamic, continuously evaluated and readjusted according to what is happening elsewhere in the 
client portfolio. The relative knowledge value of a client will shift according to the way the KIF 
pursues opportunities enabled by client relationships, so requiring rebalancing of the portfolio 
and a corresponding reallocation of relationship management resources. That is, Box C impacts 
the client portfolio (Box A), as it is constantly evolving.   
To conclude, our process model, Figure 1, explains how KIFs become ambidextrous through 
a carefully segmented client portfolio, which enables them to explore and exploit within – but 
also across - client relationships, whilst continuously dynamically adjusting this diverse client 
relationships.  
Conclusion: Managerial and Theoretical Implications  
Managerial implications. Our findings constitute a practical tool that can help managers to 
devise and manage client portfolios for ambidexterity. Although our framework emerged out of 
the global reinsurance industry, we believe it has broader conceptual application in other 
professional or knowledge-based industries – e.g. financial services, consulting, legal services, 
advertising etc. – where organizations must manage large and diverse client portfolios (see, for 
example, Dawson, 2012; McCracken et al., 2008). By segmenting the client portfolio using the 
four relationship strategies we outline, KIFs can unlock the knowledge potential of their client 
relationships to enhance their organizational ambidexterity. This may enable KIFs to manage 
their client portfolio more astutely, for example, by identifying clients with exclusive knowledge 
potential, yet possibly limited current economic value, to attain knowledge that can be used with 
other clients. This is summarized as a matrix in Figure 2.   
< Insert Figure 2 here > 
The portfolio matrix encourages managers to begin by considering the economic and knowledge 
value of their clients, asking: What is the relative economic value of this client? and What is the potential 
knowledge value of this client? Critically, our framework suggests that KIFs should not only 
concentrate on clients that are of current high value in terms of both knowledge and economic 
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indicators, but on enabling ambidexterity by balancing current and potential future knowledge 
and revenue from client relationships. Ruminating on these questions will enable managers to 
identity which clients should be managed through which of  the four relationship types.  
We described how relationship types were managed primarily through deal decisions 
(ranging from no or small deals to large deals) and interaction choices (e.g. conference meetings, 
site visits, social events). While other industries may have different interaction choices, it is 
important that the relative level of interaction (and resource cost) matches the knowledge and 
economic value of the client.  Indeed, part of the value of the framework is in identifying 
inefficiencies (over-engagement) or lost opportunities (under-engagement) where the interaction 
choices do not match the client’s value.  In summary, our framework provides an antidote to a 
pure client-service ethos, which may lead to the blanket use of expensive engagement strategies 
and over-investment in relationships that have low potential of returning that investment. 
Our findings and framework suggest that managers should continually re-evaluate their 
client portfolios and match relationship management activities to the levels of economic and 
knowledge value they can release. We also show that firms must also pay attention to potential 
internal resistance and politics in order to make the right decisions and changes to their 
portfolio. Such insights are relevant to all KIFs that have large client portfolios that change over 
time. Managers need to question and re-question whether their assessment of a client’s overall 
value (economic and knowledge value) is consistent with the relationship strategy they are 
applying (e.g. Nurturing, Holding, Investigating, Watching). This dynamism is central to the 
theory of ambidexterity: today’s high-value client may not be tomorrow’s.   
Theoretical contributions and implications for future research. Our findings and 
conceptual framework contribute to the ambidexterity and KIF literatures in a number of ways.  
First, we extend existing research on external sources of ambidexterity (e.g. Koza and Lewin, 
2000; Im and Rai, 2008; Lavie et al, 2010) by showing that client relationship portfolios are not 
simply an agglomeration of either explorative or exploitative relationships, but may enhance 
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ambidexterity through combining relationships that are a source of both both exploitation and 
exploration, albeit to different degrees (Im and Rai, 2008). This more nuanced perspective 
provides an alternative to existing approaches that examine ambidexterity at the aggregate level 
of the entire portfolio, in which the independent outputs of separate, purely explorative or 
exploitative relationships are deemed to produce the benefits of ambidexterity (Kauppila, 2010; 
Koza and Lewin, 1998; Lin et al., 2007; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Vassolo et al., 2004). We 
show that ambidexterity is neither fully explained at the level of the aggregate portfolio (Tiwana, 
2008), nor at the individual relationship (Im and Rai, 2008), but through the knowledge flows 
between relationships in the portfolio, each of which may entail different levels of exploitation and 
exploration. In particular, our process framework emphasizes a previously under-explored 
dynamic dimension to client portfolio management and the interconnections within a portfolio. 
Extending insights proffered by Lavie and colleagues (2010) and Cohen and Levinthal (1990) 
that valuable knowledge is always contingent upon an organization’s existing knowledge base, we 
have shown how managers can continuously evaluate the knowledge contributions that can be 
expected from a particular relationship in light of what has already been learned from others.  
Second, by extending our analysis to financial services that are not typically central to the 
KIF literature, our dynamic process model draws attention to the management of large client 
portfolios that may span hundreds of clients being served simultaneously. By differentiating 
different forms of client engagement and matching them to different combinations of knowledge 
and economic value, we demonstrate how large client portfolios can be managed while retaining 
control over relationship management costs. As discussed above, our study illustrates how 
organizations with similarly large client portfolios operating in other sectors  can manage their 
portfolios for greater knowledge opportunities (Dawson, 2012; Sarvary, 1999) whilst allocating 
resources to relationship management activities in accordance with their expected benefits.  
Third, our study provides an ambidexterity framework that specifically accentuates the role 
of clients, rather than the dominant focus on alliance partners as sources of ambidexterity (Grant 
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and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Kauppila, 2010; Koza and Lewin, 1998; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Lin 
et al., 2007; Padula, 2008; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Tiwana, 2008). Broadening the 
perspective on external sources of ambidexterity in this way connects ambidexterity more closely 
to the conduct of everyday business, rather than isolated strategic initiatives. That is, while not all 
KIFs rely on a portfolio of alliances, understanding how client portfolios are managed for 
ambidexterity is applicable for a wide-range of firms (Fosstenløkken et al., 2003). We contribute 
to both the ambidexterity and KIF literatures by specifying with greater clarity how 
ambidexterity can be sourced in different client relationships and what constitutes the “right” 
kinds of clients to foster business opportunities from knowledge creation (Bettencourt et al., 
2002; Fosstenløkken et al., 2003; Lowendahl, 2005; Løwendahl et al., 2001).  In particular, our 
study illustrates how variations in knowledge value may be combined within different 
relationships, and how knowledge attained within one relationship can be used to engage in both 
exploitation and exploration across relationships and the client portfolio. This has typically been 
excluded from analyses of external relationships as a source of ambidexterity and of client 
relationships as a source of knowledge more generally in the KIF literature.  
Finally, our process model extends existing work on ambidexterity by shifting focus from 
the performance effects of external ambidexterity (Im and Rai, 2008; Morgan and Berthon, 2008) 
to the process by which such benefits are realized. This process focus on ambidexterity is a 
recognized omission in existing research (Gupta et al., 2006). In particular, we focus on how a 
client portfolio becomes a source of ambidexterity through a process of attaining and using 
knowledge across the portfolio. This also advances the understanding of client portfolio 
management in the KIF literature, which has previously focused on the selection of appropriate 
clients (Bettencourt et al., 2002; Fosstenløkken et al., 2003; Skjolsvik et al., 2007) and the 
activities that generate knowledge (Nikolova et al., 2009; Reihlen and Nikolova, 2010), or sharing 
knowledge internally (Haas and Hansen, 2007; Hansen et al., 1999; Morris, 2001; Werr and 
Stjernberg, 2003). Our model provides a more complete image of these activities in KIFs, 
35 
 
bringing them together as a process of attaining knowledge through a client portfolio and 
exploring and exploiting within and across those individual relationships and then adjusting this 
portfolio dynamically. In contrast to the existing literature, this provides an explicitly dynamic 
view of the process by which client portfolios become a source of ambidexterity for KIFs.  
Our study provides the grounds for future research to take a more dynamic approach to 
enabling ambidexterity through client relationships. In addition, we hope that this will spur 
similar research in different settings and indeed further tease out comparative differences 
between firms with regards to this process.  Moreover, we believe there is scope for more 
detailed research which focuses on the particular intra-firm knowledge sharing mechanisms and 
processes that are essential to dynamic portfolio management and ambidexterity. 
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Figure 1. A process model of how client portfolios can become a source of ambidexterity for KIFs 
A. Segmenting client 
interactions
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Figure 2. A model for client portfolios as a source of ambidexterity 
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Table 1. Summary of findings: Dynamic client portfolios as a source of ambidexterity 
 
 Watching Relationships  
 
Lower economic value & 
lower knowledge value 
 
Potential exploration 
Holding Relationships  
 
Higher economic value &  
lower knowledge value  
 
Moderate exploitation 
Investigating Relationships  
 
Lower economic &  
higher knowledge value  
 
High exploitation & 
moderate exploitation 
Nurturing Relationships 
 
Higher economic & 
higher knowledge value  
 
High exploitation & 
exploitation 
 
A. Segmenting client 
interactions  
(Appendix A) 
 
 
Interaction choices 
and deal decisions 
based on client 
value  
 Focus on conference 
meetings  
 No deal [or very small 
deal] 
 Focus on conference 
and road show 
meetings 
 Moderate sized-deals 
(to attain moderate 
economic value) 
 Conference, road show 
meetings, plus site visits 
 Small deals (to attain 
knowledge value) 
 All four interaction-
types, including social 
events 
 Large deals (to attain 
value)  
B. Using client 
knowledge for 
ambidexterity (within 
client relationships & 
across the  client 
portfolio) 
(Appendix B) 
 
Explore/exploit 
within specific 
client relationship 
and  across the 
client portfolio 
 Currently low (but 
looking towards the 
future) 
 Largely focused on 
exploitation within a 
specific client 
relationship 
 
 Exploration and 
exploitation within the 
particular client 
relationship and across 
the client portfolio 
 
 Exploration and 
exploitation within and 
for the particular client 
relationships and 
across the client 
portfolio 
 
C. Dynamically 
managing client 
portfolios for 
ambidexterity 
(Appendix C) 
 
Client perceived to 
increase in value  
Shift upwards  
 Potential for increases in 
knowledge (Investigating) 
or economic (Holding) 
value or – less frequently 
– both (Nurturing) 
 
Shift to Nurturing 
 Potential to become a 
Nurturing relationship 
if knowledge-value 
increases 
Shift to Nurturing 
 Potential to become a 
Nurturing relationship if 
economic value increases 
Maintain 
 Maintain Nurturing 
relationship.  
 
Client perceived to 
decrease in value 
Consider ending 
 If the relationship 
decreases to the point 
there is no potential value 
invest time and resources 
elsewhere 
 
Shift to Watching 
 Potential to become a 
Holding relationship if 
client’s knowledge 
value decreases 
Shift to Watching 
 Potential to become a 
Watching relationship if 
client’s knowledge value 
decreases 
Shift downwards 
Potential for decreases in 
knowledge (Investigating) 
or economic (Holding) 
value, or – less frequently – 
both (Nurturing) 
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Appendix A. Segmenting client interactions  
 
Watching 
relationships 
 
- Low economic value 
and low knowledge 
value.   
- Primarily managed 
through small (or no) 
deals using conference 
meetings. 
- Little exploitation potential; but attuned to possibilities for exploration. “We are 
going to the so-call [X] conference, which is the same as Monte Carlo [largest 
reinsurance conference] for these emerging countries […] we are going to Turkey and 
we will do exactly the same…it’s extremely important to have a few relationships […] to 
know the market” (Interview). 
- Interactions (often) focused on conference meetings: “Currently our company 
doesn’t do any business with this client [...] Korea is a difficult market and we really need 
to get to understand it and know the market from within. At these conference meetings 
we can get to know more about the market, and maybe even pick up a new client” 
(Fieldnote). 
- Small (or no) deals due to value assessment: “If the information is insufficient then 
we don’t feel comfortable; you're also uncertain about the financial viability at that 
point, that’s where we say ‘oh we better not do a deal”’ (Interview). 
Holding relationships 
 
- Higher economic and 
lower knowledge value. 
- Primarily managed 
through moderate-sized 
deals and using 
conferences and road 
show meetings.  
- Low exploration potential; but moderate exploitation potential. “You need to have 
a handful of partners that give you kind of the mass, that perform decently, predictably, 
with relatively low volatility. I would say, so that it generates a decent steam of income 
[…] you need others for innovation” (Interview).  
- Interactions (often) restricted to roadshow and conference meetings:  “It’s an 
hour of talking about the business, what they’ve been doing in the last year, what is 
important in the next renewal. But if it’s a client I know I don’t want to grow further 
with, I avoid the dinner” (Interview).    
- Moderate deal-size “Bob assesses a deal he’d participated on for decades: ‘It so stable we 
haven’t done new actuarial pricing assessments since 2010’. The profit margin is slim but stable: 
“we’ve been doing this deal since 1995 with no losses ever.” He will maintain the same modest 
level of participation” (Fieldnote). 
Investigating 
relationships  
 
- Lower economic & 
higher knowledge value.  
- Primarily managed 
through small deals 
using conference, road 
show meetings, plus site 
visits. 
- Moderate exploitation potential. “With Client A we have no clue [how they work…] 
So one of the difficulties we have is understanding where these guys are going […] you 
cannot actually understand what they are doing by just listening to them, you have to 
observe them and understand them” (Interview).  
- High exploration potential: “I met this Albanian client at the conference and then 
visited them in Albania three weeks later, my first visit to that country! When I was there 
I had a closer look at their organization; their products; how they analyse policies; 
gained an understanding of regulatory topics such as how insurance premium is taxed 
for example” (Fieldnote). 
- Interactions (often) required site visits: “In Russia, the whole market is in flux. You 
need to visit the client to really understand what they are dealing with” (Interview).  
- Small deals to attain knowledge potential: “within the portfolio […] I would 
normally build additions so that you can be a bit more innovative, include different 
kinds of clients from different territories.  I mean if we explore now a market like say 
India for aviation, I wouldn't want to have my largest exposure for aviation coming 
from India, but I like to build up a little bit of know-how there through doing smaller 
deals” (Interview). 
Nurturing 
relationships 
 
- Higher economic & 
knowledge value  
- Primarily managed 
through large deals 
using all forms of 
interaction.  
- High exploitation and exploration potential. “I’d be seeing them (Manager at client) 
maybe once every couple of months, plus other members of his team.  So we’re talking 
about trying to resolve anything that was an overhanging issue from the previous flow 
but then also, the focus becomes very much on what else is there in the pipeline” 
(Interview).   
- Social events reserved for Nurturing clients: “We did a sailing event on the south 
coast of the UK just because one of our clients liked sailing […] there isn’t a deliberate 
attempt to link that directly with deals […] But if you go back to people wanting to do 
business with you, understanding why people do what they do…that’s where it makes a 
difference” (Interview).  
- Large deal. “The money comes from the big players. In each and every market I would 
say 75% is in the hands of the top five clients” (Interview).  
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Appendix B. Using client knowledge for ambidexterity 
 
Within client 
relationships 
 
Exploitation for in-client outcomes  
- “It's the specialisation of each manager within that geographical segment which gives them the 
experience with those clients, year-on-year, they get more and more familiar and do a better deal” 
(Interview). 
- “If [senior manager] goes to meet with [Mega-client’s CEO] and they have a really high level 
conversation. That has nothing to do with a specific deal, but everything to do with the mega-
client/Reinsurer relationship. That can get lost in the ether or effectively stay inside [experienced-
manager’s] head! It doesn't really get out anywhere. So with our new system, the idea is that this 
would be a depository for that sort of information that anyone can access it to improve our 
offerings” (Interview). 
Exploration for in-client outcomes  
- “You’re working with your client on new ideas and new deals. And that’s ad-hoc, that’s all dependent 
on the client. In order to do that you tend to have at least two discussions a year with each client on 
new ideas that are reflective of their business goals and what they’re trying to do (Interview). 
-  “For us to get any growth out of them (big clients), we’ve either got to go to them with a growth 
opportunity, i.e. a new product…generate a lot of new product ideas, designs” (Interview).  
  
 
Across the 
client 
portfolio 
 
 
 
Exploitation across client portfolio   
- E.g. Exploitation with one client used for further exploitation with another: Manager: “We need 
realistic market data to better understand each specific market. They [in-house analysts] are taking the 
same generic percentages for my market and some others. I can help refine this to be more market 
specific.” Senior Manager: “You want to use the information you have from your core clients to 
refine the market pricing assumptions for those markets and all the clients in them? They’ll [analysts] 
be thrilled” (Fieldnote).  
- E.g. Exploration in Territory A to engage in exploitation in Territory B: “He outlines how he came 
up with a price for the deal for the client.  To get an understanding of the deal his team had 
compared Territory A with Chinese Livestock rates – these are the mortality rates and used to 
construct relative pricing for deals in each country.  They had gained knowledge about these rates 
from clients over the last couple of years of interacting with them” (Fieldnote).   
 
Exploration across client portfolio 
- Exploration with one client that will be broadly applicable to lots of clients: “This [product] is going 
to be more and more of our reality as the global market develops. It’s a big challenge, but we really 
have to work with them [client] to develop and understand this [type of product]” (Interview). 
- Exploration with one set of client that will be broadly applicable to the portfolio: “There's a 
growing trend in the industry towards [new type of product]. We should be open to it…it’s up to us 
to for work with them on it to understand this new product” (Interview). 
- Exploitation with one client leading to exploration with others: The manager explained that they 
knew a lot about RiskA through their existing deals. In order to trade in this new type of deal 
(RiskB), which they knew very little about, with ClientA they had therefore taken their existing 
knowledge of RiskA and heavily amended it to allow him to trade in a new product. (Fieldnote). 
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Appendix C.  Dynamically managing client portfolios for ambidexterity 
 
Responding 
to 
increasing 
value 
 
-  “Chinese insurance companies have balance sheets which are enormous.  There's one Chinese insurer 
who’s got a balance sheet, in terms of dollars, of $160 billion, so they've become the largest players in 
the world and we haven't realised it […] So China is a very interesting market […] Two months ago we 
had two Chief Execs and Financial Officers from Chinese companies coming to see us here” 
(Interview).  
- “[Client X] where they have been modelling for a long time and writing small lines, trying to really 
understand that business – “we’ve been all mouth and trousers but this year we finally got close enough 
to do a big deal” […] so it is now about having an on-going relationship with them to understand their 
business even better” (Interview) 
 
 
Responding 
to 
decreasing 
value 
 
- “[This region] is a mess, it's a catastrophe…there are reasons not to write much business [in this 
territory] [...] It's complicated […] our position regarding [this territory] was quite reluctant and 
decreasing” (Interview).  
- We dropped some business this year that had no margin associated with it. So there was a deal which 
was with one of the key clients, which was about $[multi-million] of revenue last year […] but actually 
there wasn't value associated with that deal. So we got rid of it. We’ll keep an eye on it; see if it comes 
back up but … (trails off) (Interview)  
- Trap of sticky relationships/decreasing engagement a political/contested process: “For a number of reasons we tend 
to have good relationships with Client A and, and they're big and they spend a lot of money on their 
reinsurance, but I don't think it’s well priced. And, but there is pressure to do big deals with Client A 
just because it's supposed to be a key client. But I feel quite uncomfortable doing that.” (Interview).  
 
 
 
